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UNCONSCIONABILITY: PANACEA, ANALGESIC OR
LOOSE CAN(N)ON?
A Critique of Certain Recommendations in the Ontario Law
Reform Commission's Report on Amendment of the Law of
Contract (1987)
David Vaver*
This is the substance of an exchange that took place in the third
week of a first-year Contracts class:
Student: I think the example you've given is a case of an
unconscionable contract that wouldn't be
enforced by a court.
Professor: What do you mean by "unconscionable"?
Student: Something not very nice.
Professor: How "un-nice" is not very nice? Something
that would make you vomit or just get mad?
Student: "Just get mad" should be enough.'
"An unconscionable contract or term should not be enforced."
The sentence runs trippingly off the tongue. But few other propo-
sitions have so spurred writers on the law of contracts either to
Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. A version of this paper was
presented to the 17th Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law held at the
University of Toronto on October 16-17, 1987.
I thank my colleague, Professor Reuben Hasson, who read the draft of this manuscript
and made a number of useful comments.
1 This student should get an A + + in Contracts if he continues on in this vein through the
course. See Chesterfield v. Janssen (1750), 2 Ves. Sen. 125 at p. 155, 28 E.R. 82, per
Hardwicke L.C. (an "unequitable and unconscientious" bargain is one that "no man in
his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and... no honest and fair
man would accept on the other"). Or, as the Ontario Law Reform Commission
("OLRC"), in its Report on Sale of Goods (1979), Vol. 1, at p. 162, approvingly quoted
from Gimbel Bros. Inc. v. Swift, 307 N.Y.S.2d 952 (1970), at p. 954: "the doctrine of
unconscionability is not a charter of economic anarchy ... a promisor can be relieved of his
obligation ... only when the transaction affronts the sense of decency without which
business is mere predation and the administration of justice an exercise in bookkeeping."
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rapturous approval or vehement denunciation. Some remain
profoundly sceptical. 2
The reason why such a statement attracts this range of opinion is
that it is not self-defining. Pilate, jesting, might as well have said
"What is unconscionability?" and with equal aptness "Who
decides?" Theorists since well before Aristotle have argued the
toss with little conclusiveness. For unconscionability (or its less
pretentious Anglo-Saxonism "unfairness") is a function of time,
place, culture and politics. Common law judges3 in contract cases
have entered the fray, but generally have avoided facing directly
the question of what constitutes contractual unfairness. Instead
they have fashioned rules that to them seem fair when applied to
the generality of circumstances. The rules are normally sufficiently
pliant for exceptional cases to be decided exceptionally. In
addition, judges have fashioned a general escape-hatch under the
rubric of unconscionability to deal with situations where the
ordinary rules or the facts cannot be bent to accommodate their
perception of justice. Beyond that limited judicial role, they have
refused to go, recognizing that larger social problems are not
theirs to solve but are for the people through their elected repre-
sentatives in legislatures.
The OLRC in its Report on the Amendment of the Law of
Contract4 plainly wants judges to assume a larger role in policing
the contractual market-place. Part of its strategy is to encourage
judges to resort to a doctrine of unconscionability more than they
have in the past. 5
I do not agree with this strategy. I am content to see judges
exercising powers in a circumscribed way. I have no confidence
that they want to or can assume the role of a contractual police
2 The arguments pro and con are well put in Ziegel, ed., Papers and Comments delivered at
the Ninth Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law (Toronto, Butterworths,
1981): see Hasson, "Unconscionability in Contract Law and in the New Sales Act -
Confessions of a Doubting Thomas" (ibid., at p. 59); Leff, "Thomist Unconscionability"
(ibid., at p. 96); Reiter, "Unconscionability: Is There a Choice? A Reply to Professor
Hasson" (ibid., at p. 77).
3 1 use "common law" indiscriminately here and throughout this article to refer to judge-
made law, whether its origin is common law or equitable jurisdiction.
4 Ministry of the Attorney-General (1987) ("Report").
5 The OLRC foreshadowed this approach in Chapter 7 of its Report on Sale of Goods,
supra, footnote 1, but confined unconscionability to the discrete subject-matter of sale of
goods. The scope of the defence there, in the context of an elaborate spelling out of the
normal incidents of sale, might be expected to be far more modest than the scope now
propounded for the defence across the whole board of contracts.
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force. Instead of giving judges this wide-ranging mandate, I prefer
to see contractual problems isolated, thought about in their
context, and legislative solutions proposed to fix them if fixing they
need. The danger of making judges the RCCP (Royal Canadian
Contractual Police) is that people will become deluded into
believing that all contractual problems will thereby be solved. In
reality, they will not and cannot be solved in this way. Indeed, a
reform of this character may well create positive mischiefs.
With those preliminary comments, let us examine the OLRC's
Report. Plainly, the OLRC has ranged itself alongside, if not thick
in the camp of, the ardent believers in unconscionability. It has
taken to heart Reiter's battle-cry that academics "must cease
wringing their hands over the difficulties involved in unconsciona-
bility-unreasonableness cases ' 6 and grasp the nettle. In Chapter 6
of the Report, the OLRC recommended that a doctrine of uncon-
scionability be enacted to apply to all contracts. Drawing on
Canadian, United Kingdom and Australian statutory precedents, 7
the OLRC set out a list of 12 factors which a court might consider
in deciding if a contract or any of its terms should be enforced.
When it came to deal with penalty clauses and forfeitures in
chapter 7 of the Report, the OLRC said that these too should be
governed by the same criteria of unconscionability.
The arguments the OLRC used to support its recommendation
are familiar enough.
First comes the argument designed to appease legal conserva-
tives. Nothing really novel or radical is being proposed: a number
of Ontario statutes already permit a court to excuse persons from
observing their contracts on various broad discretionary grounds,
so that the OLRC proposal is merely a generalization of these
specifics. 8 Moreover, some courts have already recognized a
general doctrine of unconscionability "particularly with respect to
cases of a consumer or quasi-consumer character". 9 But some
6 Reiter, "The Control of Contract Power" (1981), 1 Oxford J. Legal Studies 347, at p. 374.
7 Viz., Uniform Sale of Goods Act 1982, subsec. 32(1), promulgated by the Uniform Law
Conference of Canada (see Proceedings of the Sixty-Fourth Annual Meeting (1982),
Appendix HH); Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (U.K.), c. 50; Contracts Review Act
1980 (N.S.W.), Vol. 1, No. 16; Business Practices Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 55, s. 2(b). See
Report, at p. 129.
8 Report, at pp. 121-3. The fact that these statutes have seen little judicial exposure is not
mentioned. The OLRC might have had the curiosity to explore the reasons for this
phenomenon: see further, text, infra, accompanying footnotes 104-06.
9 Ibid., at p. 120.
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courts apparently do not know what unconscionability means and
the Supreme Court of Canada has not "clearly recognized" the
doctrine. 10 Far from this judicial ambivalence giving the OLRC
pause, the OLRC turns it into a reason for giving unconsciona-
bility a statutory base: the doctrine will now be legitimated and
will provide courts with needed guidance.
Second come the arguments for neatness and for doing away
with legal relics. Courts have excused people from performing
their contracts for reasons other than unconscionability, but "it is
possible" to find in such cases "an underlying principle of uncon-
scionability ... that may serve to explain" a number of "seemingly
diverse matters. '" This tentative statement quickly firms up with
virtually no bridging reasoning: the "seemingly diverse matters"
become "anachronistic tools" and "fictitious techniques", and
unconscionability becomes a principle of "pervasive
importance". 12 Trade in your legal relics now for the new, all-
power, fuel-injected doctrine with the micro-circuits and flashing
lights; no matter that the old Model T principle gets you there,
while the new doctrine may forever be jacked up in the legal
service bay having "diagnostic treatment".
Third, other jurisdictions such as the United States, the United
Kingdom and New South Wales have enacted sweeping statutes
giving courts a broad discretionary power not to enforce contracts
for unconscionabililty or its verbal equivalents ("unfairness",
"unreasonableness", "harshness", "oppression", "not in the
public interest", or any combination thereof). Anybody who is
anybody is doing it, so why shouldn't we? This might have been
called the "40 million Frenchmen can't be wrong" argument, but
for the fact that the French Civil Code does not contain any such
power. 13
10 Ibid., at pp. 121, 127. Of course, the Report did not say that judges do not know what
they mean by unconscionability: it said, more politely, that the doctrine has not been
"uniformly applied by lower courts": ibid.
11 Ibid., at p. 120.
12 Ibid., at p. 127.
13 Angelo & Ellinger, "Unconscionable Contracts - A Comparative Study" (1979), 4
Otago L. Rev. 300, at p. 317: "The French, then, like the English, have some specific
rules relating to unconscionability, but do not have a general lesionary doctrine".
The position is apparently similar in Quebec, where, according to Laskin C.J., courts
do not have a dispensing power "to refuse to enforce a promise in strict conformity with
its terms": H. F. Clarke Ltd. v. Thermidaire Corp. Ltd. (1974), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 385 at p.
392, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 319 at pp. 330-1.
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Fourth comes the moral imperative: courts should be able to
"redress the imbalance where parties are not bargaining from
equal positions and where the stronger party has taken advantage
of its superior power to impose harsh and oppressive conditions on
the weaker party". 14 Three cheers for that, but can't one identify
these situations more precisely? Yes and no, says the Report: 15
[Wihile it is true that some unconscionable clauses are readily identifiable, it
would be impossible to list all clauses to which a presumption [of
unconscionability] or prohibition should apply.
The Report does not name names and tell us what these "readily
identifiable" clauses are. All it is prepared to identify is the
"enforceable" end of the unenforceability/enforceability
spectrum: unconscionability is not "a life jacket for persons who
have entered into a bad bargain; nor should it interfere with the
right of parties to bargain freely with respect to the terms of their
contract."16
The Report is attractively and succinctly written. It has lots of
footnotes and should therefore be presumed prima facie correct.
Yet even a well-disposed reader will find the Report flawed in a
number of key aspects and will thus find it difficult to agree with its
reasoning and conclusion. The flaws include: (1) methodology;
(2) logic; (3) interpretation of the current law; (4) strategy; (5)
implementation of strategy; and, ultimately (6) a failure to grapple
with the underlying values that unconscionability masks.
1. Methodology
The Report proposes legislation. Is it too much to expect the
Report to have been written in a way that might appeal to a legis-
lator of good will who is asked to support its enactment? That
person might ask some obvious questions which the Report
answers obscurely at best:
- At what mischiefs is this proposal aimed?
- Is the present law not avoiding these mischiefs?
- Who will benefit from the proposed change?
- Who will be harmed by it?
14 Report, at p. 127.15 Ibid., at p. 135.
16 Ibid., at p. 127.
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- Is the proposal the best, or at least the most politic, way of
addressing the mischiefs?
The legislator might go on to ask what evidence the authors of
the Report have to suggest that any claimed mischiefs do indeed
exist. On this the Report is conspicuously silent.
In part this can be traced to the Report's methodology. None of
the authors seems to have poked a nose out of his or her office or
law library to find out what contractual mischiefs were actually
occurring in the market-place. The Report hews to the path of
traditional law reform: contract law problems are to be found in
law reports under the index heading "Contracts", not in the
streets, stores or offices of the nation. No business person or
consumer seems to have been asked what problems he or she is
encountering; or even if the sorts of problems encountered in the
law reports are real, anecdotal or endemic; and if real or endemic,
how such problems might be solved. 17 Perhaps the OLRC
suspected that the same "discouraging apathy" encountered when
it tried to survey business persons' attitudes about reform of the
sale of goods law would again surface: business people and
consumers alike found the law practically irrelevant to their
ordinary affairs. 18 Still, there is no a priori reason why careful field
research might not have yielded useful results. Admittedly, the
OLRC works under budgetary constraints; but, at the least, the
complaints files of the many departments of the Ontario
Government and of the trade and consumer organizations that
abound in Ontario and Canada generally could have been tapped
as a valuable and suggestive resource. One is left wondering
whether the problems the Report isolates are real-life problems at
all or are mere fantasies whirling around inside the authors' heads.
In this light, the charge the Report levels against judges who use
"anachronistic tools" for decision making is paradoxical: a dose of
material taken from law reports, contracts textbooks and contract
statutes seems in itself an anachronistic tool with which to fashion
modern law reform.
17 OLRC members apparently did discuss some matters covered by the Report with
practising lawyers. Whatever the scope of these discussions, they do not appear to have
had much or any impact on the drafting of the chapters dealing with unconscionability.
18 OLRC, supra, footnote 1, Vol. 1, at pp. 25-6.
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2. Logic
The method by which the Report proceeds lacks logical rigour.
Its language is that of faith more than of reason.
Such logic as there is proceeds along the following lines: uncon-
scionability exists at common law, yet not all courts seem to under-
stand it and the Supreme Court has failed to recognize it "clearly".
Not only is it a stand-alone doctrine, it is (or may be) a "principle"
underlying other doctrines. Not only is it a good doctrine and
principle, it is a better principle than that which currently exists.
Therefore, it should be more prominent. This requires legislation.
Other doctrines should be downgraded or replaced by uncon-
scionability. The law of Ontario will then be better because cases
will be decided on clearer grounds. This will make future decisions
more predictable.
Some of this reasoning seems internally inconsistent and much
of it is undocumented. On the one hand, the Report ahistorically
traces unconscionability back to the 19th century; 19 on the other
hand, it implies that unconscionability may be a figment of lower
courts' imagination since the Supreme Court might not recognize
it. Moreover, lower courts have not applied unconscionability
"uniformly"; significantly for a Report replete with footnotes, not
one example is given of this default. 2°
The Report should have got its story straight. If unconsciona-
bility is really such a pervasive doctrine and principle, deeply
rooted in legal history, why on earth would the Supreme Court not
recognize it? If it has not been applied uniformly, in what respects
has it been going wrong? Do we need legislation simply to affirm
an existing doctrine or is a new one being created?
Most of the Report's reasoning is purportedly empirical, rather
than a priori, and so should depend for its validity on evidence.
But evidence is remarkably lacking. We are told that unconsciona-
bility "may" serve to explain rules against forfeiture of leases and
clogs on the equity of redemption, relief against penalty clauses
and against "certain" contracts in restraint of trade, and the
19 Report, at p. 120, note 7. In fact, equitable jurisdiction springing from the Chancellor's
conscience is much older. In Coco v. A.N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd., [19691 R.P.C. 41
(Ch.), at p. 46, Megarry J. said: "a couplet attributed to Sir Thomas More, Lord
Chancellor, avers that 'Three things are to be helpt in Conscience; Fraud, Accident and
things of Confidence.' (See 1 Rolle's Abridgement 374)."
2 0 Ibid., at p. 121.
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devices used by the courts to circumvent exemption clauses of
various kinds;21 to which one might reply with equal cogency,
unconscionability "may" equally serve not to explain such
matters. Tentative assertions of this kind prove nothing, even
when the Report later restates them more emphatically without
saying why what was a mere possibility seven pages earlier is now a
fact. 22 The force of such assertions can logically be dissipated by
equally tentative, generalized and plausible assertions. Here is
one of my own (though I claim no credit for its originality): quite
different policies "may" serve to explain this veritable rag-bag of
cases historically, and quite different individual policies "may" be
needed to justify each of them today.
Moreover, we are not told what shortcomings the various
excuses for non-performance exhibit, informed as they (all, most,
many, or some?) "possibly" are by unconscionability, 23 and why
these deficiencies are so serious that the excuses should be jetti-
soned in favour of some overarching principle of unconsciona-
bility. It is surely not enough simply to assert that all these excuses
are "anachronistic tools" and "fictitious techniques" without
subjecting at least some, if not all, to analytical scrutiny. It is at
best sloppy, and at worst devious, reasoning to pick "fundamental
breach and adverse construction" as the devils with which to scare
off all, most, many or some other excuses for non-performance in
favour of the salvation angel of unconscionability. In this light, the
Report's assertion that unconscionability is the better way is
unpersuasive.
3. Interpretation of Current Law
The OLRC apparently wants to help persons who have less
bargaining power than others in cases where "the stronger party
has taken advantage of its superior power to impose harsh and
oppressive conditions on the weaker party". 24 The conclusion the
21 Ibid., at p. 120, citing, in note 6, Waddams, The Law of Contracts 2nd ed. (Toronto,
1984), Canada Law Book Inc., pp. 327-40, 345-7 and 393-4.
22 See quotation accompanying foonote 12, supra.
23 Report, at p. 120: "It is possible to range even more widely, and find in other existing
categories of excuse for non-performance of a contract an underlying principle of uncon-
scionability. In particular.. The reader is asked to infer that all, most, or many such
excuses are explicable in these terms. All, most or many minds may well marvel at the
daring sweep of the generalization - and ultimately at its essential meaninglessness.
24 Ibid., at p. 127. One should however note that nowhere in the actual criteria the Report
proposes to be enacted is this emotive language actually used: ibid., at pp. 129-30.
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OLRC wants us to draw from this noble ideal is that legislating a
doctrine of unconscionability will enable courts to assist weaker
parties where they presently cannot do so.
Two questions immediately spring to mind: are not courts
doing, or at least saying that they are doing, this already? Have
they indicated any case where common law doctrine hamstrings
them from assisting a weaker party? The answer to both questions
is, obviously, no.
The Report itself appears to agree with this, at least in part,
when it says that unconscionability is already of "pervasive
importance".2 Apparently, however, the persons administering
the judicial system cannot recognize this, for the Report criticizes
them for using "anachronistic tools" and "fictitious techniques"
instead of unconscionability. Counsel and judges are apparently
speaking prose without quite knowing it. So, if judges tossed away
their fictitious ploughshares and picked up the hi-tech unconscion-
ability implement instead, they would no longer "conceal the
reasons for judicial decision": they would start developing "clear
principles" and applying their minds to "truly relevant criteria for
decision" .26
A number of claims seem to be made here, of varying degrees of
dubiousness. If the claim is that judges are hampered in doing
justice because of the tools which they have hand-crafted for
themselves and which they are unable to refashion, the judges
themselves might well be surprised. It is flatly contrary to their
own rhetoric, of which the following two passages may be repli-
cated ad nauseam from the law reports:
It has always been assumed that one of the virtues of the common law system
is its flexibility, that it is capable of changing with the times and adapting its
principles to new conditions. 27
... [T]he Courts have not been slow either to adapt or extend the ancient
principles of law so as to apply them to new conditions prevailing in the
community.28
Plainly, the Report must think that these statements are false if
applied to unconscionability, but little proof is forthcoming.
25 Ibid., at p. 127.
26 Ibid.
27 Fleming v. Atkinson (1959), 18 D.L.R. (2d) 81 at p. 99 , [1959] S.C.R. 513 at p. 535,per
Judson J.
28 Krouse v. Chrysler Canada Ltd. (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 15 at p. 22, 10.R. (2d) 225 at p.
232 (C.A.), per Estey J.A. for the court. Estey J.A. also approvingly cited Judson J.'s
remarks in Fleming v. Atkinson, supra, footnote 27.
[Vol. 14
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It is not as if an unconscionability doctrine does not already exist
in Canadian common law. However, for some reason that is not
clear, the Report downplays this phenomenon to an extraordinary
extent. It first says that "some recent judicial decisions reflect an
acceptance of a generalized doctrine of unconscionability, particu-
larly with respect to cases of a consumer or quasi-consumer
character", citing three decisions of the Ontario Court of Appeal
and two from the British Columbia Court of Appeal. 29 This is
some understatement. The Report omits to say that many other
decisions mention and even purport to apply the doctrine, both in
those courts and in other provincial courts, including courts of
appeal. 30 Indeed, when Lord Denning, in his famous judgment in
Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Bundy, 31 said that English law recognizes a
category of "unconscionable transaction" extending to "all cases
where an unfair advantage has been gained by an unconscientious
use of power by a stronger party against a weaker", he specifically
drew on two Canadian cases for support. Moreover, the Report's
statement, that unconscionability applies "particularly with
respect to cases of a consumer or quasi-consumer character", 32
appears to suggest that its application outside such cases is rare or
sporadic. This is not so. Of the four recent cases cited in the
footnote to this statement, one might broadly (but not particularly
aptly) categorize two as cases of a "consumer or quasi-consumer
character": a case where an injured person settled with an
insurance adjuster 33 and one where a person mortgaged property
29 Report, at p. 120, and notes 7 and 8.
30 See, e.g., Knupp v. Bell (1968), 67 D.L.R. (2d) 256 (Sask. C.A.), affg 58 D.L.R. (2d)
466; Natuk v. Kawula (1979), 104 D.L.R. (3d) 288 at pp. 291 et seq., 1 Man. R. (2d) 25 at
pp. 29 et seq. (C.A.); Buchanan v. Can. Imperial Bank of Commerce (1980), 125 D.L.R.
(4th) 394 at pp. 400-02, 23 B.C.L.R. 324 at pp. 331-4 (C.A.); Wallace v. Toronto-Do-
minion Bank (1983), 145 D.L.R. (3d) 431 at pp. 440, 449 et seq., 41 O.R. (2d) 161 at pp.
169,179 etseq. (C.A.); Bomek v. Bomek (1983), 146 D.L.R. (3d) 139 at pp. 144-5, [1983]
3 W.W.R. 634 at pp. 640-1 (Man. C.A.); Osorio v. Cardona (1984), 15 D.L.R. (4th) 619
at pp. 629-32,59 B.C.L.R. 29 at pp. 39-42 (S.C.); Bertolo v. Bank of Montreal (1986), 33
D.L.R. (4th) 610 at pp. 617 et seq., 57 O.R. (2d) 577 at pp. 583 et seq. (C.A.); Principal
Investments Ltd. v. Thiele (1987), 37 D.L.R. (4th) 398 at pp. 401-06, 12 B.C.L.R. (2d)
258 at pp. 262-6 (C.A.); and generally, Waddams, supra, footnote 21, at pp. 380 et seq.
The test generally approved is that suggested by Crawford, "Comment" (1966), 44
Can. Bar Rev. 142, at p. 143: a "combination of inequality and improvidence" invokes
the jurisdiction: see Wallace v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, supra, at p. 440 D.L.R., p. 169
O.R., per Houlden J.A. (dissenting), who cites Crawford for the proposition that "the
power of a court to declare the provisions of a contract unenforceable on the grounds of
unfairness or unconscionability is well established in Canadian law".
31 [1975] 1 Q.B. 326 (C.A.), at pp. 337-8, citing Morrison v. Coast Finance Ltd. (1965), 55
D. L. R. (2d) 710 (B.C.C.A.), and Knupp v. Bell, supra, footnote 30.
32 Report, at p. 120.
33 Ibid., at p. 120, note 7: Beach v. Eames (1976), 82 D.L.R. (3d) 736, 18 O.R. (2d) 486
(Co. Ct.), affd D.L.R. loc. cit., O.R. loc. cit. (C.A.).
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with a bank as collateral for a friend's indebtedness. 34 But the
purchase of a commercial fishing boat with its licence and a
minority stockholder's claim that he was shortchanged in a
corporate takeover 35 assuredly do not qualify even as "quasi-
consumer" cases, any more than do later cases which the Report
claims could have been more aptly decided on unconscionability
grounds.36
All this is buttressed by the curious half-truth that the Supreme
Court of Canada has not "clearly recognized" the doctrine. But,
within the last couple of decades, the court has dealt with uncon-
scionability submissions at least four times, twice striking down a
term or a contract, 37 and twice refusing to do so. 38 One may
criticize the court's reasoning or application of the doctrine, but
that is another matter. To suggest, as the Report does by
innuendo, that the court would sometime in the future deny the
doctrine's existence is implausible, especially when the court has
traditionally relied so heavily for its contract doctrine on English
common law. 39 The Report does not in any event hint why the
34 Ibid.: McKenzie v. Bank of Montreal (1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 641, 7 O.R. (2d) 521
(H.C.J.), affd 70 D.L.R. (3d) 113,12 O.R. (2d) 719 (C.A.).
35 Ibid.: Harry v. Kreutziger (1978), 95 D.L.R. (3d) 231,9 B.C.L.R. 166 (C.A.), and Dusik
v. Newton (1985), 62 B.C.L.R. 1 (C.A.), respectively.
36 Report, at p. 121, note 9. The cases cited are discussed infra accompanying footnotes 49
et seq.
37 Mundinger v. Mundinger (1970), 14 D.L.R. (3d) 256n, [1970] S.C.R. vi, affg, without
opinion, 3 D.L.R. (3d) 338, [1969] 10. R. 606 (C.A.), where the court had unanimously
applied unconscionability to strike down a settlement on breakdown of marriage; H.F.
Clarke Ltd. v. Thermidaire Corp. Ltd. (1974), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 385 at p. 392, [1976] 1
S.C.R. 319 at p. 331, per Laskin C.J., Judson and Spence JJ. concurring, where a
majority of the court based its refusal to enforce a penalty clause on the court's "manifes-
tation of a concern for fairness and reasonableness, rising above contractual stipulation".
38 Bauer v. Bank of Montreal (1980), 110 D.L.R. (3d) 424 at pp. 429-30, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 102
at p. 110, where a unanimous court rejected the submission that a particular clause in a
bank guarantee was "onerous and unreasonable", without suggesting that the
submission was legally irrelevant (note that McIntyre J., who wrote the judgment, had,
as a court of appeal judge, accepted the doctrine of unconscionability without any
qualms: Harry v. Kreutziger, supra, footnote 35); Dyck v. Manitoba Snowmobile Ass'n
Inc. (1985), 18 D.L.R. (4th) 635 at p. 637, [198511 S.C.R. 589 at p. 593,per curiam, (7-
person court), holding that an agreement waiving claims for personal injuries arising
from a sports accident was enforceable, since it did not fall within the class of cases
"where the differences between the bargaining strength of the parties is [sic] such that the
courts will hold a transaction unconscionable and so unenforceable where the stronger
party has taken unfair advantage of the other".
39 The Privy Council recently affirmed the existence of an equitable doctrine of unconscion-
ability, while confining it to cases where a party has been induced to contract "as a result
of victimisation" and not merely through "contractual imbalance not amounting to
unconscionable dealing": Hart v. O'Connor, [1985] A.C. 1000 (P.C.), at p. 1018. The
[Vol. 14
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court might want to deny the faith and overrule a large body of
Canadian case law, including decisions delivered or subscribed to
by most of the present justices of the court.
Even the Report's claim that courts have not "comprehen-
sively" addressed the types of relief available for
unconscionability 4° is a little misleading. Courts tend to categorize
unconscionability as a species of equitable fraud and thus import
the remedies for that type of action into unconscionability,
including rescission on terms, adjusting the price to a "fair"
level, 41 and more latterly compensation when rescission is
impracticable. 42 It is perhaps more accurate to say that, apart from
the substantive recommendation that the Attorney-General be
given standing to apply for an injunction to enjoin the actual or
incipient making of unconscionable contracts, 43 the OLRC's
recommendations on remedies will put beyond argument what
remedies should be available, while preserving the court's
discretion to decide which remedy is appropriate in a particular
case.
4. Strategy
The foregoing discussion indicates in part what the OLRC's
strategy was. It was to assert that unconscionability was secreted in
the interstices of the common law, but was not very well worked or
thought out: so legislation was needed to prod the judges along.
Once legislation was proposed, one could include a beefed-up
unconscionability provision with consequential beefed-up
remedies.
I have tried to demonstrate that the premise for this strategy is
non-existent or at least flawed. But the Report does apparently
have a fall-back position, which runs something like this: although
unconscionability exists at common law, courts do not apply it
often enough; if they did, cases would be more clearly decided;.
presumably also, cases would be more justly decided, for clarity
without justice seems a rather modest goal for which to strive. 44
court considered this to be the position in England, Australia and New Zealand, and
other countries whose common law stemmed from England: ibid., at p. 1017.
40 Report, at p. 127.
41 Paris v. Machnick (1972), 32 D.L.R. (3d) 723 at p. 732, 7 N.S.R. (2d) 634 at p. 644
(S.C.).
42 Dusik v. Newton, supra, footnote 35.
43 Report, at pp. 133-4.
44 The laws of apartheid are clear enough; presumably, if they were not, the Report would
1988]
52 Canadian Business Law Journal
This fall-back position is also unpersuasive. The Report does
not expressly identify any case where a court has failed to protect a
weaker party from harsh and oppressive conditions imposed on it.
On the contrary, what it principally objects to is that "[m]any
cases in which a general doctrine of unconscionability might have
been applied continue to be decided on other grounds". 45 The
problem the Report therefore claims to see is one of means, rather
than ends. Let us examine this claim.
First, if the OLRC believes that giving courts overt tools with
which to work will mean the disappearance of covert tools, it is
deluding itself. A quarter of a century after the promulgation of
the Uniform Commercial Code, with its famous section 2-302
allowing courts to strike down unconscionable contracts,
American courts are still liberally using well-worn techniques of
interpretation and construction to avoid "unconscionable"
contracts and clauses. 46 True, more cases may now be decided on
unconscionability grounds than previously, but it is unrealistic to
imagine that unconscionability can ever attain more than partial
hegemony.
This phenomenon is perhaps more significant than has been
realized. The Realists assumed, and their Canadian neo-equiva-
lents continue to assume, that judges would actually welcome
having overt tools with which to work. Some judges may, but
certainly not all. Though obviously aware of the immediate conse-
quences of their decisions, judges may prefer to decide a case on a
legalistic ground rather than taking the forthright course of calling
one of the parties a rogue.47 This may reflect humans' tendency to
ask them to be made clear. For what purpose, though, is not entirely plain: so that people
could know unequivocally for or against what they were fighting?
45 Report, at p. 121. The one case with which the Report does take issue (at pp. 141-2) is
itself highly debatable: H. F. Clarke Ltd. v. Thermidaire Corp. Ltd., supra, footnote 37.
There, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada struck down a clause providing for
"agreed damages" in the event of breach of a business contract. The majority thought
that the clause did not purport to quantify the plaintiff's losses on breach. Instead, the
clause purported to strip the defendant of the gross trading profit made from the breach.
The clause was plainly "punitive", in the sense that no common law court would have
made such an order in the absence of the clause even if the contract-breaker were a
fiduciary of the contract victim - which it was not.
46 "Courts have often used interpretation or construction to avoid giving effect to an inher-
ently unfair provision of an agreement when a decision based on unconscionability would
have been more candid": Farnsworth, Contracts (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1982),
pp. 498-9, quoted in Goldberg, "Unconscionability in a Commercial Setting: The
Assessment of Risk in a Contract to Build Nuclear Reactors" (1983), 58 Wash. L. Rev.
343, at pp. 345-6, note 14.
47 1 had this forcibly drawn to my attention some years ago when I was lecturing (or
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avoid confrontation; it may flow from limitations in the judicial
process on finding out the "real" truth of any case; it may be part
of a larger strategy of maintaining judicial power free from the
public scrutiny that plain talk frequently attracts.
Second, the examples the Report notes as cases where "uncon-
scionability might have been applied" instead of other grounds are
a curious brace indeed. 48 They seem to undermine rather than
advance the Report's case. In the first one, Heffron v. Imperial
Parking Co. ,49 a person whose car was stolen from a parking
garage and damaged recovered the cost of repairs and the value of
lost contents from the garage, even though prominent signs at the
garage and wording on the driver's parking stub informed him that
''we are not responsible for theft or damage of car or contents,
however caused". Roaming the byways of bailment, fundamental
breach and construction, Estey J.A., for the court, reached the
result that the driver was not bound by this transparently clear and
simple language. The same result might have been reached
through unconscionability, but whether the reasoning would have
been any more comprehensible or would have provided any firmer
guidance for later cases may be doubted. The checklist of 12 non-
inclusive factors the OLRC provides will not help much: some
factors lean in favour of the plaintiff succeeding, some in favour of
the defendant, and no one (least of all, I suspect, the OLRC) has
any idea which factors should prevail or how they can or should be
weighted. But all this merely diverts attention from the silliness of
the result in Heffron, however reached. 50
hectoring) a group of judges on their propensity not to give the "real" reasons that
motivated them to decide cases. One judicial wag called from the floor: "Why on earth
would we want to do that?", a comment that drew a spontaneous round of laughter and
applause. Appeal dismissed.
48 Report, at p. 121, note 9.
49 (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 642,3 O.R. (2d) 722 (C.A.).
50 The case presumably involved the following scenario. The motorist's insurer had paid out
the owner and was now pursuing a subrogated action against the garage and, indirectly,
the garage insurer. By having its policy-holder put up signs and insert exemptions in the
parking stubs, the garage insurer wanted to insulate itself against this sort of suit, as well
as against those rarer cases where the motorist was uninsured. The garage might have
avoided the car's theft by taking better and relatively costless precautions. This suggests
that it should carry the risk as the most efficient loss-avoider. On the other hand, as Estey
J.A.'s decision indicates, a court can, with the benefit of hindsight, always find some
additional cheap precaution that a garage could have taken to avoid virtually any mishap.
Decisions such as Heffron force garages either to self-insure or carry insurance. Parking
costs to all are thus raised for the benefit of a few un- or under-insured motorists. Heffron
ought therefore to have respected the allocation of risk the garage sought to impose by
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In the second case, Murray v. Sperry Rand Ltd.,51 a farmer
obtained restitution and consequential losses flowing from a
failure of agricultural machinery to live up to promises of perfor-
mance the sellers made orally and in their promotional brochures.
The court danced its way around a disclaimer clause to hold the
seller, the distributor and the manufacturer jointly and severally
liable. No doubt the farmer could also have won on unconsciona-
bility grounds, as similar plaintiffs have done in the United
States, 52 by demonstrating how closely the farmer's intellectual
qualities matched those of the plants he was growing and how
sophisticated and tricky the sellers really were. But this is to shave
with a sword, instead of Occam's razor. Statements of perfor-
mance designed or expected to come to a buyer's attention should
always bind the seller and any person making or party to them; any
contrary disclaimer should be ineffective. There is already a
judicial53 and legislative trend to this effect. Far from being a
useful tool, unconscionability is a positive hindrance to the extent
that it diverts attention away from such more compact solutions.
The third example, Beaufort Realties (1964) Inc. v. Chomedey
Aluminum Co. Ltd. ,54 is even odder. A subcontractor was allowed
to file and enforce a mechanic's lien for work done on a property,
even though its contract with the head contractor contained a
contract; its result is to create inefficient and costly overlaps in insurance coverage. Some
decisions now explicitly recognize this point: see, e.g., ITO-International Terminal
Operators Ltd. v. Miida Electronics Inc. (1986), 28 D.L.R. (4th) 641 at p. 675, [1986] 1
S.C.R. 752 at p. 799. But they are too few and far between to represent a counter-trend
to the enormous number of cases where courts have delighted in avoiding an exemption
clause without regard to the insurance consequences.
There may, of course, be a case for the motorist's recovering from the garage the
amount of his uninsured deductible, but this is no reason for allowing him to recover as
well the insured loss for his insurer's ultimate benefit.
51 (1979), 96 D.L.R. (3d) 113 at pp. 120-2, 23 O.R. (2d) 456 at pp. 463-5 (H.C.J.).
52 Leff included farmers in his list of "presumptive sillies" apparently recognized by courts,
a list which includes sailors, heirs and women: "Unconscionability and the Code - The
Emperor's New Clause" (1967), 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485, at pp. 532-3. Recent American
case law confirms this for farmers: Mallor, "Unconscionability in Contracts Between
Merchants" (1986), 40 Sw. L. J. 1065, at pp. 1083-4, even when the farmer looks more
like an agribusiness or when, in cases such as Langemeier v. National Oats Co., 775 F.2d
975 (C.A. 8, 1985), he is an experienced agricultural financier and only a thesis away
from a doctorate in agronomy.
53 For judicial predisposition to this effect, see Hallmark Pool Corp. v. Storey (1983), 144
D.L.R. (3d) 56 at pp. 65-6, 45 N.B.R. (2d) 181 at pp. 197-8 (C.A.),per La Forest J.A. for
the court.
54 (1980), 116 D.L.R. (3d) 193, [198012 S.C.R. 718, affg 97 D.L.R. (3d) 170,24 O.R. (2d) 1
(C.A.).
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comprehensive clause renouncing lien rights. Both the Ontario
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada claimed that
the clause, properly construed, was not supposed to cover the
situation where the contractor had repudiated its contract with the
subcontractor. The way that Wilson J.A. in the Court of Appeal
phrased the question to be answered ("is it fair and reasonable in
the context of this fundamental breach that the waiver of lien
continue to bind the [subcontractor]? ' '54a) is so close to the
language of unconscionability that she plainly would have reached
the same result under the latter doctrine. Two points should be
noted. First, the result under either route is strange. The only
purpose of a waiver of lien clause is to protect an owner from
having its property encumbered, and thus from encountering
delays in getting loans to finance the property, precisely when the
head contractor fails to pay its subcontractors. 55 The Beaufort
Realties clause was worded in typically broad language that did not
limit its operation by reference to the reason for or nature of the
head contractor's default. Why the courts should decide to protect
subcontractors from the plain consequences of the contracts they
sign is unclear. Second, unconscionability will remain only an
alternative means of deciding a case such as this. The OLRC has
not purported to abolish the doctrine of fundamental breach or
rules of construction. Beaufort Realties and the reasoning upon
which it is based will continue as a binding precedent. Faced with
another similar case, why would court or counsel prefer the less
predictable path of multi-factor unconscionability to Beaufort?
Third, take the rare case where a Canadian court has purported
to apply a broad concept of unconscionability, albeit as an alter-
native ground, to avoid an exclusion clause. In Davidson v. Three
Spruces Realty Ltd.56 the plaintiffs sued to recover the value of
property of theirs that had disappeared from the defendant's
vault. The defendant, which had rented the vault space to the
plaintiffs, pleaded that the plaintiffs had signed a contract
containing a wide exclusion clause which, among other things,
exempted it from liability for loss of property or "for any act,
54a 97 D.L. R. (3d) 170 at p. 178, 24 O.R. (2d) 1 at p. 8.
55 See, e.g., Freedman v. D. Thompson Ltd. (1968), 66 D.L.R. (2d) 465 at pp. 468, 472,
[1968] S.C.R. 276 at pp. 280, 285; Baillie, "Exemption Clauses: Are Couriers Fair
Game?", in Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada, Law in Transition:
Contracts (198 4), p. 65, at p. 72.
56 (1977), 79 D.L.R. (3d) 481, [197716 W.W.R. 460 (B.C.S.C.).
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neglect or omission whatsoever". When the contract was signed,
the defendant told the plaintiffs that almost absolute safety was
assured and that the plaintiffs need not insure their property. In
fact, the defendant ran its operation with few security precautions
and failed to advise the plaintiffs that other goods had been stolen
from the vault. Anderson J. allowed the plaintiffs' claim, holding
the exclusion clause inapplicable on four alternative grounds. One
was that the clause was unconscionable and thus unenforceable as
an "abuse of freedom of contract". 57 The judge listed seven
factors that he thought supported this conclusion. 58 The OLRC
might well have used this case as an example of the mess into
which contract doctrine has fallen. But is unconscionability the
way out? Davidson's case suggests not. The result is plainly right
on a short well-established ground: 59 a defendant who dissuades a
plaintiff from insuring property that is later lost through the
defendant's negligence should be liable for the value of the
property, since its action caused the plaintiff's loss. 60 The
57 Ibid., at pp. 492-3 D.L.R., pp. 476-7 W.W.R. The other three grounds for holding the
clause unenforceable or inapplicable were: (a) it did not apply to vault storage but to
safety box rental (another branch of the defendant's business); (b) the defendant's "gross
negligence" constituted a "fundamental breach" of contract, to which the clause did not
apply; and (c) the defendant's misrepresentation about safety and insurance induced the
plaintiffs to believe that no exclusion clause existed or would be enforced. These
grounds, and the reasoning supporting them, overlapped considerably.
58 "(1) Was the contract a standard form contract drawn up by the bailee? (2) Were there
any negotiations as to the terms of the contract or was it a commercial form which may be
described as a 'sign here' contract? (3) Was the attention of the plaintiffs drawn to the
limitation clause? (4) Was the exemption clause unusual in character? (5) Were represen-
tations made which would lead an ordinary person to believe that the limitation clause
did not apply? (6) Was the language of the contract when read in conjunction with the
limitation clause such as to render the implied covenant made by the bailee to use
reasonable care to protect the plaintiffs' property meaningless? (7) Having regard to all
the facts including the representations made by the bailee and the circumstances leading
up to the execution of the contract, would not the enforcement of the limitation clause be
a tacit approval by the Courts of unacceptable commercial practices?" Ibid., at p. 493
D.L.R., pp. 476-7W.W.R.
59 Bauer v. Bank of Montreal (1980), 110 D.L.R. (3d) 424 at p. 430, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 102 at
p. 110.
60 Cf. cases where a party's promise to insure is interpreted as making the insurance moneys
the pool from which compensation is to be sought, thereby modifying the ordinary legal
allocation of risk: Commonwealth Construction Co. Ltd. v. Imperial Oil Ltd. (1976), 69
D.L.R. (3d) 558 at p. 567, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 317 at pp. 329-30.
Davidson raises a further general point: is a party to a contract bound to tell the other
of events arising before or during the contract that might impair the other's expectation
that the contract will be duly performed? The much criticized case of J. Nunes Diamonds
Ltd. v. Dominion Electric Protection Co. (1972), 26 D.L.R. (3d) 699, [1972] S.C.R. 769,
suggests not, but surely the OLRC should have considered whether or not this holding
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additional unconscionability verbiage - these were "unac-
ceptable commercial practices", regard had to be had to "all the
facts", the clause was so "unreasonable" as to be a "clear abuse of
freedom of contract" 61 - just confuses the analysis. The club of
unconscionability is not needed to batter the gnat of misrepresen-
tation. As in Murray v. Sperry Rand Ltd. ,62 unconscionability
again diverts attention away from this compact solution to an
amorphous and unpredictable line of reasoning. The court's
implicit invitation to other courts and to counsel to resort more
often in the future to unconscionability has not been accepted.
Davidson has not become a leading case; instead, it stands
unwanted and virtually alone. Is this not itself a suggestive
phenomenon?
5. Implementation
Let us assume that, given legislation of the sort the Report
proposes, courts would indeed eschew other devices and would
use unconscionability more. This would realize the Report's
strategy to give unconscionability the lead role, instead of merely a
bit part, in the new play "Contractual Excuses Redefined". What
would be achieved by this?
Fear not, says the Report: there will be no "flood of uncertain-
ty"; in fact, "the volume of litigation has been extremely modest"
in jurisdictions with an unconscionability provision; the problem
of inconsistent decisions can be cleared up by setting out statutory
criteria, so that judges will not be enabled "to impose their view of
public policy on the market place". 63
All these claims are implausible. First, compare the Report's
statement that "the volume of litigation has been extremely
modest" in unconscionability jurisdictions with the statement
made in a recent American article: "The courts took several years
should generally prevail. In its prior Report on Sale of Goods, supra, foonote 1, the
OLRC recommended that a plaintiff who learned of such events could insist that the
defendant give an "adequate assurance of due performance", failing which the plaintiff
could withdraw from the contract (ibid., vol. 2, at pp. 528 et seq., adopting the principle
of U. C. C. Art. 2-609). At that time, the OLRC avoided imposing any duty on the
defendant to advise the plaintiff of such events. Should it not now have faced this issue
squarely when dealing with general contract reform?
61 Davidson, supra, footnote 56, at p. 493 D.L.R., p. 477 W.W.R.
62 Supra, footnote 51.
63 Report, at pp. 127-9.
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to begin using the doctrine of unconscionability agressively, but
the doctrine now has been litigated in literally hundreds of
cases".64 If this is the OLRC's view of "extreme modesty", one
can feel only relief that the OLRC has no jurisdiction over the law
of pornography. But perhaps the OLRC would confess and avoid:
there may be lots of litigation in the U.S. but Canadians (or
Ontarians) are not as litigious. 65 For the sake of argument, let it be
accepted that there may not be an enormous amount of litigation;
in any event, if unconscionability will do good things, fiat justitia,
ruant curiae.
Second, take the point that the doctrine will not lead to
uncertainty. 66 In Dyck v. Manitoba Snowmobile Ass'n 67 the
Supreme Court of Canada in a terse per curiam opinion recently
said that a 19-year-old plaintiff, injured through the defendants'
negligent conduct of a snowmobile race in which the plaintiff was
participating, could not sue for damages: as a condition of entering
the race, the lad had signed a waiver absolving the defendants
from liability for such negligence. The court rejected an argument
that the waiver was unconscionable :68
The association neither exercised pressure on the appellant nor unfairly took
advantage of social or economic pressures on him to get him to participate in
its activities. ... [T]he races carried with them inherent dangers of which the
appellant should have been aware and it was in no way unreasonable for an
64 Mallor, supra, footnote 52, at p. 1070 (emphasis added).
65 That this is so is not self-evident: witness the new litigation business which the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms has spawned and which threatens to overwhelm the
courts.
66 Note that the Report does not entirely have the courage of its convictions because, after
saying that the form of the doctrine adopted elsewhere has not led to a "flood of uncer-
tainty", it goes on to propose criteria to flesh out the bare bones of unconscionability, so
that the concerns of some critics "can be satisfactorily answered": Report, at p. 127. If it
in fact is true that there has been no "flood of uncertainty", the critics are already satis-
factorily answered. Interestingly enough, the OLRC itself previously recognized that
unconscionability involved serious questions of uncertainty when it said in its Report on
Sale of Goods (supra, footnote 1, Vol. 1, at p. 163) that "[w]e appreciate that
businessmen may not welcome this additional layer of uncertainty", but countered this
by saying that Ontario courts would exercise their power "responsibly". Perhaps we are
only talking about "acceptable" levels of uncertainty, and the current Report's authors
intend merely to emphasize the word "flood". The implication is then that only a
"trickle" instead of a "flood" of uncertainty requires to be stemmed.
67 (1985), 18 D.L.R. (4th) 635, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 589. For a fuller criticism of this case, see
Vaver, "Developments in Contract Law: The 1984-85 Term" (1986), 8 Supreme Court
L. R. 109, at pp. 124 et seq.; Gibson, "Developments in Tort Law: The 1984-85 Term",
op. cit. , at pp. 356 et seq.
68 Ibid., at pp. 637-8 D.L.R., p. 593 S.C.R.
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organization like the association to seek to protect itself against liability from
suit for damages arising out of such dangers.
Would the case be decided any differently under the Report's
new criteria? I have run the case by the criteria point by point with
all the good will that I can muster and have reached a firm
conclusion: I haven't the slightest idea!
Let us see why. The task is to decide if the waiver "is unconscio-
nable in the circumstances relating to the contract at the time it
was made". 69 No definition is given of "unconscionable" but all
lawyers know that it is an obscurantist term simply meaning
"unfair". 70 Let us go through the criteria one by one, leaving
criterion (a) (a really difficult one) for last.
Under criterion (b), is the waiver "reasonably necessary for the
protection of the interests" of the association? Yes (maybe), if its
interest is not to be sued for negligence. No (maybe), if its interest
is not to take or to relax reasonable (costly or costless?) precau-
tions that it might otherwise have taken; and/or if the interest
being protected is merely that of the association's insurer; and/or if
the association's interest in having its premium remain low is
'unreasonable".
Under criterion (c), the degree to which Dyck was required to
waive his rights, which he otherwise had, to sue the association, its
officials and agents for negligence is total. Is this good or bad?
Under criterion (d), is there "gross disparity" between the
considerations given by the association and Dyck when compared
with other similar contracts in similar circumstances? Quite apart
from the question of what disparities are "gross", what is this
criterion getting at? Presumably, some understanding of the
market in waivers,71 so that one can work out if the price paid ($25
69 Report, at p. 136, Recommendation #4. The check-list of factors is conveniently summa-
rized here, at pp. 136-7, as well as at pp. 129-30.
70 Thus in Stockloser v. Johnson, [1954] 1 Q.B. 476 (C.A.), at p. 492, Denning L.J.
"entirely agreed" with the trial judge's statement that " 'if it is a question of what is
unconscionable, or, to use a word with a less legal flavour, unfair, I can see nothing
whatever unfair in the defendant retaining the money' ". More recently, in Elton John v.
James (November 29, 1985, Ch. D.), Nicholls J., having found a "dominating influence"
exercised by the manager in a management contract with a composer-musician, went on
to hold that the agreement at its inception "was an unfair transaction (I prefer to use this
expression rather than 'unconscionable transaction', but without intending any different
meaning.)" (Judgment, at p. 100).
71 Just as occurs in antitrust and anti-competition cases, there may be a problem of defining
the relevant market.
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and the giving up of a personal injury suit) is too high for what
Dyck was getting (the chance of snowmobiling, winning a prize,
and the risk that the association might omit safety precautions).
Does anyone else in Manitoba, some other province or some other
country give up their tort rights for a $25 entry fee and the chance
of winning a prize? Yes, Dyck did it before. And Mr. Crocker
recently paid $15 in return for a similar waiver and chance for prize
money when he entered a tube-racing spectacle in Ontario. 72 But
is this "similar"? Is there a "gross disparity" between the
considerations? Crocker's case was in Ontario; it was tube-racing;
the spectacle was a gimmick to attract the masses; the Molson
people were there plying the contestants with drink; the entry fee
was 40% lower, but we are not talking about large dollar amounts.
What if we find that some sports offer two sorts of entry fee: a
higher one if you take out insurance, a lower one if you sign a
waiver?73 How far afield do we range? Shall we look at sports in
pari materia to snowmobile racing? In what respects - in the
degree of danger, such as professional (or amateur) car racing,
equestrian events, track and field, or chess (where the participants
sometimes come to blows)? And what if we find that every other
sport takes a waiver? What conclusion do we draw from this: that
there is a (desirable or undesirable?) conspiracy or conscious
parallelism between sports organizers, sports sponsors, sports
insurers, against sports people? And what if people have protested
about waivers - is this evidence that waivers are known, good,
hateful to people, to some people? Should we then blame
concerned sports people for not banding together and rising
against this iniquity?
Perhaps we are entitled to look even more widely on the
question of what "considerations" were exchanged. Dyck gave up
his right to sue the association and its officials for negligence, but
the latter did not give up their rights against him. So, Dyck can
recover nothing against them if they are negligent, but the associ-
ation and its officials can recover their full damages from Dyck if
he is negligent towards them. In the actual case, Dyck swerved to
avoid the negligent official; he caused himself harm rather than
choosing to run over the official. Had Dyck been fully aware of the
72 Crocker v. Sundance Northwest Resorts Ltd. (1985), 20 D.L.R. (4th) 552, 51 O.R. (2d)
608 (C.A.), leave to appeal to the S.C.C. granted [198611 S.C.R. vii.
73 Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370 (Col. S.C., 1981) (sky-diving).
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implications of the one-way waiver, he might rationally have
thought: "Since I will get nothing if I injure myself because of the
negligence of the association and its officials, I might as well look
after myself first. If any officials get in my way, I may as well run
them down. I have few assets and no third-party liability
insurance, so if they sue me, they will get nothing." Thus, the
effect of the association's not providing Dyck with a reciprocal
waiver is to discourage altruistic behaviour and to encourage
antisocial negligent behaviour. Is this a "disparity" between the
"considerations" that can be labelled "gross"?
Under criterion (e), did the association know, when entering
into the contract, that Dyck would be substantially deprived of the
benefit or benefits he reasonably anticipated under the contract?
This is a little tricky. The benefit he expected under the contract
was a chance to win prize money. The waiver at the time must have
appeared ancillary to that. What benefit did Dyck "reasonably
anticipate" from the waiver? Note that there are two possible
routes that might be taken:
(i) Dyck had read the waiver previously, he had scanned it
on this occasion, he thought it was "mumbo-jumbo", he didn't
really care what it meant, he thought it was like a lease or loan
agreement: "all these things were something which he ignored
... something used to avoid hassles and to frighten people off
from suing." 74 From this, an inference could be drawn that he
subjectively "anticipated" not being able to sue anyone if he
got hurt in the race. Moreover, even if he did anticipate being
able to sue, this was "unreasonable": as a normative matter,
he (and other like people) should read their contracts; if they
don't, that's their fault. The court should discipline them for
not doing so or not seeking information about the meaning of
the contract. Where would the world be if people didn't read
their contracts or could get out of them by not reading?
OR
(ii) Dyck might have read the contract but he didn't really
understand what it meant or its full implications. After all, he
was only a young man waiting to enter the race. It is a bit hard
74 This appears in the trial judge's judgment, [1981] 5 W.W.R. 97 at p. 102, 11 Man. R. (2d)
308 at p. 315 (Q.B.), per Kroft J.
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to expect him to have a full appreciation of the insurance
company legalese in which the waiver was couched. It might
also be a bit hard to expect him to appreciate fully the risks he
was running: that the association was more intent on putting
on a good show than caring too hard about the safety of the
participants. He might have thought that he would have some
trouble suing someone if an accident occurred, but did he
reasonably anticipate that he was giving up all hope of
recovery even if the association and its officials were
negligent? To the point of causing him $60,000 in personal
injuries loss? Even if they were insured and the loss would be
borne by an insurer and not the association or its officials
personally? Even if he did not have personal disability
insurance, as indeed most people of his age (and indeed most
people of any age in Canada) would not?
Under criterion (f), was the natural effect of the transaction, or
either party's conduct prior to the contract, such as to cause Dyck
to some relevant degree "to misunderstand the true nature of the
transaction and his ... rights and duties thereunder"? Again, one
of two possible routes is open:
(i) Dyck knew that the document was a legal one intended
to affect his rights adversely, to frighten him off from suing.
He was going to race, come what may. He didn't care what he
signed. Inference: he must have understood the true nature of
the transaction.
OR
(ii) Dyck didn't really appreciate the full impact of what he
was signing. How could a 19-year-old lad be expected to
understand the risks of snowmobiing, including the risk that
the association was going to run the race negligently? How far
does anyone understand the legalese in which waivers are
written and the reality of what one is giving up by signing
them?
Under criterion (g), Dyck did not have independent advice, but
should he have reasonably secured it? Again, two possibilities:
(i) There was no independent lawyer advising people at
the track, but Dyck could have asked the officials. They might
not have been "independent" but they could have given him
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advice. If they misrepresented the nature of the document, he
might have been able to avoid the waiver. 75 If he was worried
about waivers, he could have sought independent advice
elsewhere before the race, since he knew a waiver would need
to be signed. He chose not to, and didn't care what he was
signing. We shouldn't care about people who don't care for
themselves.
OR
(ii) We can't expect people to ask for an independent
lawyer's advice every time they sign a legal document.
Everybody was signing waivers at the track. Isn't there
something unmanly about a jock, willing to take risks on the
track, asking a lawyer about risks? The association should
have educated people more about the nature of what they
were signing and told them to take out insurance themselves to
cover the possibility of injury.
Under criterion (h), what is the relative bargaining strength of
the parties, taking into account reasonable alternative sources of
supply or demand? Two possibilities:
(i) The defendant was just a voluntary association, not
General Motors. Dyck was a member of it. If he didn't like the
terms, he could have tried to get the association to change
them. If they didn't change them, then he didn't have to race.
He could watch instead. Or he could do other things on the
prairies. Snowmobiling isn't a staple of life like food. The
association didn't put a gun to his head to make him sign. He
signed "voluntarily".
OR
(ii) The association wasn't going to let Dyck race if he
didn't sign. The terms were: "sign the waiver or stand on the
sidelines". We will have to reconsider the evidence under
criterion (b): Could Dyck have raced on different terms
elsewhere? Taken up a substitute such as sky-diving, cross-
country skiing, chess? Could we possibly make an argument
that the association was a spot mini-monopolist in
75 Or not: see Bauer v. Bank of Montreal, supra, footnote 59.
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snowmobile-racing services and thus under a duty to provide
"fair" terms of entry? 76
Under criterion (i), did Dyck know or should he reasonably have
known of the existence and extent of the waiver terms? Yes and
no: see previous discussion.
Under criterion (j), was Dyck or the association better able to
guard against the loss or the damages? The association comes off
worse here. The accident was caused because the official signalling
the finish walked into the middle of the track and Dyck crashed
while swerving to avoid him. The idea behind this extraordinary
behaviour was that it was both a point of honour for officials to get
as close to the finishing vehicles as possible and to put on a "show"
for the spectators. This behaviour could have been changed
costlessly by a simple instruction from the association. Instead, it
encouraged it by acquiescence. Equally effective and costless
means of putting on a good show must have been available.
On the other hand, this criterion obscures another relevant
point. It is quite possible that the best risk-avoider may not be the
person upon whom it is "just" to place the risk. For example,
suppose (contrary to the facts in Canada and many other
countries) a society where most persons carry first party disability
insurance which compensates them adequately for personal
injury; and suppose further that third party liability insurance is
not commonly carried by sports organizers. Even though the
association might be the best risk-avoider, it might be "fair" to
enforce the waiver if the result prevents Dyck's insurer recovering
its losses through a subrogated action against an uninsured
association. 77 After all, Dyck might have been injured without
anyone's fault, in which case the insurer would have had no action;
why should the happenstance that Dyck could sue for negligence
put the insurer in a better position?78
Under criterion (k):
76 See, e.g., Vaver, supra, footnote 67, at pp. 159-60.
77 Thus, if best risk-avoider A tells the other party B to take out insurance against the risk
that occurs and B agrees, it would seem "fair" to place the risk of loss on B, whom the
parties intend to be compensated through the purchase of insurance: T. Eaton Co. Ltd.
v. Smith (1977), 92 D.L.R. (3d) 425, [197812 S.C.R. 749.
78 This logic leads to a more general argument that subrogated actions generally should be
abolished: see Hasson, "Subrogation in Insurance Law - A Critical Evaluation" (1985),
5 Oxford J. Legal Studies 416.
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(i) How was the contract formed? Simply by telling Dyck
to sign on the dotted line, which he did. There was no expla-
nation, and the form was in legalese.
(ii) Was it on "written standard terms of business"? It was
on written standard terms, but it is difficult to call the activities
of a voluntary association running snowmobile races a
"business".
(iii) The "setting, purpose and effect of the contract" is
evident from what has been said already.
Under criterion (1), Dyck and the association had entered into
similar contracts previously, and the association required waivers
of all contestants. What is the significance of this? That an evil
repeated many times becomes good? That repetitive conduct
causes no surprise and therefore should be reinforced by a court?
Now back to criterion (a): to what degree did the association
take advantage of Dyck's inability to protect his interests because
of his "[physical or mental infirmity, illiteracy], inability to under-
stand the language of an agreement, lack of education, lack of
business knowledge or experience, [financial distress], or because
of the existence of a relationship of trust or dependence or similar
factors"? 79 We know the Supreme Court of Canada's answer on
this factor, which the Report calls "the traditional area of equity
unconscionability": 80 Dyck was educated, he was well able to look
after his interests if he wanted to, he should have understood the
form, the relationship between him and the voluntary association
was not one of trust or dependence. On the other hand, Dyck's
apparent nonchalance and his relationship with the association
can be viewed differently, and with some plausibility. 81 It could
also be argued that he lacked "business knowledge and
experience" or that there were "similar factors" to a "relationship
of trust or dependence". 82
This exercise reveals the flaws in the Report's strategy. By
trying to make unconscionability do everything, one ends up by
making it do virtually nothing. The claim that unconscionability
79 The words in parentheses appear in the criterion but do not seem to apply to this
particular case.
80 Report, at p. 130.
81 Vaver, supra, footnote 67, at pp. 159-60.
82 It is not clear whether "similar factors" applies merely to the last phrase or whether it
applies to all the factors mentioned in criterion (a).
3-14 C.B.L.J.
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can be made certain, or more certain, by listing 12 non-exclusive
factors is false. For one thing, the 12 factors may be deduced from
the plethora of unconscionability cases in the U.S., where the
doctrine is no clearer. The matter cannot be improved by elimi-
nating all factors or listing 100.
Nor are the factors given any particular priority or weighting.
Does a plaintiff with three factors in its favour trump a two-factor
defendant, assuming (as will often be the case) that other factors
are irrelevant or virtually so? Does it depend upon which three
factors a plaintiff has, or on which two the defendant has, or on
which factors are irrelevant?
Further, the factors themselves are not merely descriptive but
heavily prescriptive. The word "reasonably" is writ large in many
of them. As our discussion above has shown, it is quite possible to
reach different conclusions on whether one factor favours a
plaintiff or a defendant. What conclusion will be reached will
depend very largely on one's starting point. In a case such as Dyck,
a judge might reach exactly the same result under the OLRC
criteria if he or she starts from the premise that people willing to
take physical risks should also be prepared to take contractual
risks. Thus, Finlayson J.A. recently said for the majority of the
Ontario Court of Appeal: s3
Our permissive society encourages risk-taking activities from scuba-diving
to sky-diving and those who participate cannot have their cake and eat it.84 If
they insist upon taking abnormal and completely unnecessary risks, they
cannot complain of the consequences inherent in the very risk that makes the
activity challenging and attractive.
How does this square with the Report's claim, already referred
to,85 that judges will not, through unconscionability, be "enabled
to impose their view of public policy on the market place"? Judges
are already imposing these views without unconscionability; why
would they not do so with the doctrine? Moreover, one avowed
purpose of the OLRC Report was to encourage judges to declare
openly their views instead of using covert tools. It is not clear that
the Report invites them to change their views; if so, the invitation
is discreetly veiled. In the end, it is likely to be some expressed or
83 Crocker v. Sundance Northwest Resorts Ltd., supra, footnote 72, at p. 564 D.L.R., p. 620
O.R.
84 From personal observation, I think it is quite difficult either to have or eat cake while sky-
diving, and the exercise is certainly messy while scuba-diving.
85 Supra, text accompanying footnote 63.
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unexpressed judicial ode to individual liberty or to collective
responsibility as a value to be promoted, rather than a turgid
cogitation over unconscionability's 12 or more factors, that will
dictate the result of an individual case.
Against this background, the Report's sanguine observation
that a "wrong" decision can always be appealed 86 must have been
made in jest. Commenting on statutes allowing courts not to
enforce "unfair and unreasonable" contracts, the House of Lords
has said that it does not want appellate courts (including itself)
clogged up with appeals from a trial judge's "quasi-discretionary"
decision on unconscionability. Does not the following sentiment
cause the believers in the "bounded uncertainty" of unconsciona-
bility a little pang of doubt? :87
... [T]he court must entertain a whole range of considerations, put them in
the scales on one side or the other, and decide at the end of the day on which
side the balance comes down. There will sometimes be room for a legitimate
difference of judicial opinion as to what the answer should be, where it will
be impossible to say that one view is demonstrably wrong and the other
demonstrably right. It must follow, in my view, that, when asked to review
such a decision on appeal, the appellate court should treat the original
decision with the utmost respect and refrain from interference with it unless
satisfied that it proceeded upon some erroneous principle or was plainly and
obviously wrong.
In short, only an unconscionable decision on unconscionability
has any chance of being reversed.
6. Underlying Values
Many years ago, Professor Macaulay pointed out that the rules
of contract law (be they common law or statutory) can be classified
as furthering one of two opposing policies: on the one hand are
policies supporting the institution of a free market (or economic
efficiency); on the other are policies designed to promote general
economic welfare by social control (or distributional equity). Free
market policies emphasize self-reliance, minimizing disruption of
plans and losses incurred on the faith of there being a bargain, and
86 Report, at p. 127.
87 George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd. v. Finney Lock Seeds Ltd., [1983] 2 A.C. 803 at p. 816
(H.L.), per Lord Bridge, the other judges concurring. The court's comments were
directed both to the provisions of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (U.K.), and also
to its predecessor provision which was directly in issue in the case. Cf. the discussion of
this language in relation to the Contracts Review Act 1980 (N.S.W.) in Antonovic v.
Volker (1986), 7 N.S.W.L.R. 151 (C.A.), at pp. 154 et seq. and pp. 166-7.
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the presence of clear rules to aid quick and rational bargaining. On
the other hand, policies designed to promote general economic
welfare by social control include relieving hardship where
enforcement would be unduly harsh, allocating losses to the party
best able to spread or absorb them, and providing generalized
rules that would prevent certain bargains being made or would
encourage market changes in various industries. 88 All judges
consciously or subconsciously effect these policies in their
decision-making; but individual judges differ in individual cases
on which set of policies to apply in a particular case.89 Court-
watchers can hazard guesses as to the way a particular judge will
likely jump in a particular case90 but, when the composition of a
particular appellate panel is unknown, forecasting an actual
decision is akin to gazing into a crystal ball with vaseline-smeared
spectacles. What is conscionable or fair obviously depends upon
one's starting point.
Unconscionability now, and as envisaged by the Report, plainly
falls within the second class of policies suggested by Macaulay. It is
not, as the Report claims, a sort of golden thread running through
the law of contracts. Rather it is a form of rhetoric that masks
unresolved conflicting values. The Report does not suggest how to
resolve this conflict. It nowhere suggests what values unconsciona-
bility should espouse, nor can one glean any consistent theory
from its language. Simply to say that some "standard form terms
and manifestly unfair bargains" should not be enforced tells no
one, least of all judges, counsel or contractors, anything about
which terms or which bargains the Report is talking.
The examples given in the Report do not reveal its thinking: the
OLRC seems prepared to see waiver of lien clauses struck down,91
car insurers shifting their losses to parking garage insurers,92
88 Macaulay, "Justice Traynor and the Law of Contracts" (1961), 13 Stanford L. Rev. 812,
at pp. 814-15.
89 See, e.g., Stockloser v. Johnson, supra, footnote 70, where two common law judges
(Somervell and Denning L.JJ.) indicated a preference for social control over contracts by
asserting an equitable jurisdiction to order repayment of moneys paid under an aborted
commercial instalment contract. The third judge, Romer L.J. (an equity judge),
disclaimed the existence of any such jurisdiction, thereby indicating a preference towards
free market policies.
90 Thus Laskin C.J. tended to social control of contracts rather than pure free market
theory; see Vaver, "Developments in Contract Law: Chief Justice Laskin and the Law of
Contracts" (1985), 7 Supreme Court L. R. 131, at pp. 2 1 0 -1 1 .
91 Beaufort Realties (1984) Inc. v. Chomedey Aluminum Co. Ltd. (1980), 116 D.L.R. (3d)
193, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 718.
92 Heffron v. Imperial Parking Co. (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 642, 3 O.R. (2d) 722 (C.A.).
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manufacturers being able to recover an exclusive distributor's
gross profits for the latter's breach, 93 and farmers recovering lost
profits arising from the failure of defective machinery. 94 Why any
of this should be so is not answered. Nor is it answered by
observing the way courts play the unconscionability game in the
United Kingdom and the United States, as well as in Canada.
In these countries, the occasional consumer contract is set aside
for unconscionability, but standard form contracts between
business parties are increasingly being struck down: not surpris-
ingly, since a business party has more incentive and resources to
resist enforcement and litigation costs can generally be written off
as a business expense against income tax. Thus, in the United
States, farmers have succeeded in recovering consequential
damages for crop losses arising from defective herbicides95 and
defective machinery, 96 despite standard form contractual
disclaimers seeking to insulate the seller from such losses. In one
case, the court said:97
With increasing frequency, courts have begun to recognize that experienced
but legally unsophisticated businessmen may be unfairly surprised by uncon-
scionable contract terms ... and that even large business entities may have
relatively little bargaining power, depending on the identity of the other
contracting party and the commercial circumstances surrounding the
agreement.
Commenting on such cases, a writer sympathetic to the concept of
unconscionability in business contracts has admitted:98
Unconscionability is not a highly predictable doctrine even with the fullest
exposition of the facts of a case. A review of the merchant cases indicates
that courts are less likely to explain themselves in merchant unconsciona-
bility than in consumer cases.
In the United Kingdom, in the space of two years, the highest
court has decided at least three cases dealing with unconsciona-
bility. It has said that a farmer could recover lost profits from a
seed supplier for supplying defective seed, even though the
contract on standard and commonly used terms clearly limited the
supplier's liability to the price of the seeds. 99 The reasoning given
93 H.F. Clarke Ltd. v. Thermidaire Corp. Ltd. (1974), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 385, [1976] 1 S.C.R.
319.
94 Murray v. Sperry Rand Ltd. (1979), 96 D.L.R. (3d) 113,23 O.R. (2d) 456 (H.C.J.).
95 Durham v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 315 N.W.2d 696 (S.C., South Dakota, 1981).
96 A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rep. 114 (C.A., 1982).
97 ]bid., at p. 124.
98 Mallor, supra, footnote 52, at p. 1087.
99 George Mitchell, supra, footnote 87. For critical comment on the case in the Court of
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was totally unconvincing. Not only was the clause standard in the
seed supply industry but the National Farmers' Union had never
protested it. To find the clause unenforceable, the court said that
the agreement was not negotiated (does this mean that every
clause in an insurance contract is up for grabs?); that the supplier
was negligent (but then why else have the clause?); that suppliers
had previously negotiated settlements with farmers who had been
supplied defective seeds (but since when have settlements to "buy
peace" been relevant or even admissible as admissions of
anything?); and that suppliers could cheaply insure against the risk
(but why couldn't the farmers equally purchase cheap crop
insurance?). In another case, the court said that a contract made
between two farmers for the sale and purchase of land at an under-
value should be enforced without requiring the buyer to pay the
difference to make up the market price, even though the seller was
insane: 100 the seller was legally advised and the buyer did not know
of the seller's latent insanity. 10 1 In yet another case, the court said
that a woman induced by her husband to give a bank security over
the family home so as to keep the husband's business afloat was
bound by the charge, even though she had no independent legal
advice and the atmosphere attending the transaction was "tense"
with the husband "in and out of the room, 'hovering around'" 102
The bank had misrepresented the effect of the charge: none the
less (or perhaps therefore) this was "an ordinary banking
transaction". 103
In Canada, Professor Hasson concluded that courts are likely to
give relief on unconscionability grounds in "truly egregious
cases". 1°4 But what strikes a judge as "egregious" is itself an
amorphous concept, as Hasson recognizes. For example, an
Appeal and the House of Lords, see Hasson, "The Conflict between Law and
Commerce" (1983-84), 8 C.B.L.J. 218; Hasson, "The Nine Lives of Fundamental
Breach" (1985), 10 C.B.L.J. 80.
100 What now of Chesterfield v. Janssen (1750), 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 28 E.R. 82?
101 Hart v. O'Connor, [1985] A.C. 1000, reversing the New Zealand courts that had set
aside the bargain.
102 National Westminster Bankplc v. Morgan, [1985] A.C. 686 (H.L.), at p. 701.
103 Ibid., at p. 709. This is not an isolated phenomenon. In Bauer v. Bank of Montreal
(1980), 110 D.L.R. (3d) 424 at p. 430, [198012 S.C.R. 102 at p. 110, the Supreme Court
of Canada similarly labelled the giving of a bank guarantee as an "ordinary commercial
transaction", even though the bank had, as a condition of obtaining the guarantee,
made a promise that it failed to fulfil. The court ruled the promise to be inadmissible
because of the parol evidence rule (ibid., at pp. 431-2 D.L.R., p. 112 S.C.R.).
104 Hasson, supra, footnote 2, at p. 61.
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ingenuous observer might have thought that a three-month small
loan at 200-300% per annum effective interest would prima facie
qualify for the epithet "egregious" or "unconscionable", if not
something worse. One's view might have been reinforced by the
fact that the person seeking this declaration was not a borrower
wanting to welsh on a deal but a provincial Director of Trade
Practices acting in the public interest under specific legislative
authority. But this was not enough for a judge of the British
Columbia Supreme Court. He refused to grant an interim
injunction against a tax discounter whose business was advancing
cash on such terms, against an assignment of the proceeds of the
taxpayer's income tax refund as calculated by the discounter,
without having further evidence: 105
There is no material before me to assist in establishing the circumstances of
the people who avail themselves of this "service". Who are they? To what
extent are they a credit risk? Would they be able to borrow money
elsewhere? Are they unemployed, and if so what are their prospects of
employment? Are they transients? Were they in any way taken advantage
of? What was their capacity to reasonably protect their own interest? Were
they literate? Were they ignorant? Were they sober? Did they fully appre-
ciate what they were doing? Did they understand the various documents that
were signed? What are the risk factors in the business under consideration?
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the British Columbia government did not
take up the court's invitation to investigate the mental capacity
and job history of each of the no doubt hundreds of persons who
dealt with the lender. Instead it passed legislation fixing the
maximum percentage chargeable under this form of loan. 106
I do not have the slightest idea if (a) the OLRC approves
decisions such as these; (b) these cases would be decided the same
way in Ontario under current unconscionability theory or any
other theory; (c) they would be decided differently under the new
OLRC criteria for unconscionability; or (d) a tiny change in the
facts would cause a different decision even in the originating juris-
diction. The OLRC has done nothing to reduce the legal expense
that accompanies an unconscionability action; indeed, by
increasing the number of factors and loading them with a value
105 Hanson, Director of Trade Practices v. John's Tax Services Ltd. (March 5, 1975), per
McKay J. The case was brought under the unconscionability provisions of what is now
the Trade Practices Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406.
106 Consumer Protection Act, S.B.C. 1977, c. 6, s. 37. The story is told by Belobaba, "Reg-
ulating the Income Tax Discounter - A Study in Arbitrary Government" (1979), 1
Can. Taxation 21.
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decision, the OLRC has probably increased the expense of
preparing or combating such a case. The person with the deepest
pocket is once again likely to triumph.
There is a more efficient and less costly way of proceeding. It is
to stop pursuing the dream that doctrinal tinkering will have much
impact on contract law, except by making it easier to state in legal
primers. I would leave unconscionability pretty much the way it is
now: a marginal doctrine designed to protect people who can't
help themselves against people who can and do help themselves at
the former's expense. I would then concentrate on specific legal
reform. Even from the limited data base provided by the law
reports, the OLRC could readily identify particular problematic
areas and make concrete suggestions for dealing with them, such
as:
(a) Plaintiffs generally (including businesses and farmers)
should always (or never) be able to sue for consequential
losses flowing from defective products supplied to them; or, if
one wishes to espouse a different policy, standards of quality
and fitness implied by sale of goods legislation or common law
can never be contracted out of, even by commercial parties,
unless the plaintiff has had independent legal advice;
(b) Banks should never recover on charges or guarantees
entered into for sums over $x unless the defendant has had
independent legal advice;
(c) Waivers of personal injuries should never be binding, or
should be binding only if the plaintiff has been given the choice
of another waiver-free alternative;
(d) Brokers should never recover commission from their
principals if the brokered contract fails to complete for no fault
of the principal ;107
(e) Employees should be entitled to at least one month's
notice for every year worked with an employer or associated
corporation ;108
107 In H.W. Liebig & Co. Ltd. v. Leading Investments Ltd. (1986), 25 D.L.R. (4th) 161,
[198611 S.C.R. 70, the court reached this result on the facts of the case by a 4-3 majority,
with 1 of the 4 in the majority writing an opinion concurring in the result. Another useful
precedent for the future!
108 Sometimes a court holds a short-notice provision in an employment contract
enforceable in the case of a long-term employee (Wallace v. Toronto-Dominion Bank
(1983), 145 D.L.R. (3d) 431,41 O.R. (2d) 161 (C.A.)), and sometimes not (Allison v.
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(f) Unconscionability can never be pleaded by a corporation
or person having a net worth of $x.
And so on.
I do not mean to suggest that these proposed rules are the best
solution to the social and economic situations in which they arise.
They are hypotheses reflecting particular values that can be
argued over, defended or rejected - and not just by lawyers but
by those actually affected by their operation. More or less radical
solutions could equally be suggested and tested. Knowledge of
current market conditions and the likely impact of the rules on
future markets would, where appropriate, be obtained before
they might be implemented. This information might cause the
hypotheses to be modified or rejected. Moreover, whether or not
the proposed rule was politically acceptable and the means
suggested for its enforcement and administration (court, tribunal,
or something else) was the most appropriate could be considered
in the normal way. At least, the task would be carried out once and
for all, legislation enacted, and people guided thereby.
The fact that we cannot identify all the situations that might
offend the right-thinking OLR Commissioner is no reason for not
trying to find some. And, having found some, to say (as has been
suggested) that the legislature is unlikely to act to rectify the
situation, is either dubious or devious. It is dubious because, as the
example of tax discounting has shown, legislatures are willing
(however imperfectly) to regulate particular unfair contracts. 109 It
is devious insofar as it suggests that legislative unwillingness to
regulate particular unfair contracts entitles unelected judges to
perform this task. I should first have to be convinced that legisla-
tures were indeed unwilling to deal with a perceived evil; but if this
were in fact true in a specific case, it is a perversion of constitu-
tional law to suggest that this gives judges a mandate to provide
their own solution. X0
Amoco Production Co. (1975), 58 D.L.R. (3d) 233 at p. 240, [1975] 5 W.W.R. 501 at p.
508 (Alta. S.C.), approved in Wallace, at p. 441 D.L.R., p. 170 O.R. ,per Houlden J.A.,
dissenting). Unconscionability as a control device works as erratically here as anywhere
else.
109 See, supra, text accompanying footnotes 104 to 106. See further, Milczynski, "Tax
Rebate Discounting in Canada: The Case for Abolition" (1987), 2 Jo. Law & Social
Policy 73, at p. 74, who concludes that "[tlhe only solution to the problem of tax
discounting's intrinsic unconscionability and ineffective regulation is its complete and
total ban".
110 Compare the following view: "[T]here is a growing resistance to overregulation of the
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In any event, bad decisions in contract cases will not disappear
by giving judges broader powers to tamper with unfair contracts.
The results will not likely be vastly different from those currently
reached, nor will the reasoning be any clearer in the sense that
future cases will be more predictable.111 Professor Trebilcock has
recently exposed the disarray into which the common law doctrine
of restraint of trade, one of those areas which the Report claims is
infused with a concept of unconscionability, 112 has fallen. He
convincingly argues that, if economic efficiency is the goal of this
doctrine, it is far from clear that courts are the appropriate instru-
ments to achieve the results desired. While recognizing that the
alternatives to judicial regulation are not ideal, Trebilcock equally
cautions against "comparing highly flawed legislative, bureau-
cratic and regulatory processes with an idealized or romanticized
vision of the common law". 113 As far as the OLRC is concerned,
this message has fallen on deaf ears.
Trebilcock's words remind us of what the late Professor Leff
observed two decades ago in respect of unconscionability: 114
One may suggest that first (and less important) it tends to permit to make the
true bases of decisions more hidden to those trying to use them as the basis of
future planning. But more important, it tends to permit a court to be
nondisclosive about the basis of its decision even to itself... [W]hen you
forbid a contractual practice, you ought to have the political nerve to do so
with some understanding (and some disclosure) of what you are doing. ...
Subsuming problems is not as good as solving them, and may in fact retard
solutions instead.
Leff, where are you when we need you?
economy. Rather the pressure is to reduce the number and powers of existing regulatory
agencies. This suggests an enlarged, not a reduced role, for the courts in policing the
fairness of disclaimer clauses": Ziegel, Comment (1979), 57 Can. Bar Rev. 105, at p.
117.
111 Thus, in George Mitchell, supra, footnote 87, all 10 judges involved in the case from trial
through the appeals agreed that the plaintiff was able to avoid the exemption clause in
that case. The Court of Appeal offered a bewildering number of reasons why this should
be so, quite apart from the point that the term was not "fair and reasonable". And why
was the clause not "fair and reasonable"? Because it took away the plaintiffs statutory
rights. Will a clause that takes away those rights always be "unfair and unreasonable"?
No. When will it be? Probably if it would have been avoided at common law before the
statute that gave courts the express power to strike down the clause. Is the reasoning on
"fairness and reasonableness" going to help one advise the result of later cases? Re-read
Lord Bridge's statement accompanying footnote 87, supra, for the illuminating answer.
112 Report, at p. 120.
113 Trebilcock, The Common Law of Restraint of Trade - A Legal and Economic Analysis
(1986), p. 4 13.
114 Leff, supra, footnote 52, at pp. 557-9.
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